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STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION: AGAINST 
THE LAW ... SORT OF 
Jason David Fregeau* 
When Congress has prohibited certain conduct, law-abiding citizens 
presumably refrain from that conduct voluntarily. The defendant in 
an injunction proceeding who asks the court to balance the remedies 
in his favor is, in effect, asking the court to approve of his decision 
not to comply with the duties that law-abiding citizens comply with 
voluntarily. Thus, the court is being asked to voice its approval of 
lawless conduct. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION: A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE TRADITIONAL 
EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Problems occur when court-created procedures for issuing injunc-
tions conflict with legislative enactments. If a law prohibits an act 
and the prohibited act likely will continue, an injunction against 
continuing the act normally would issue. 2 A court, however, seem-
ingly would have the duty and the discretion to balance the injuries 
to the parties before enjoining the prohibited act. Following the 
traditional approach of equity, an injunction would not issue if the 
balance of the harms favored a party continuously breaking the law. 3 
An injunction is an equitable remedy.4 Equitable remedies are not 
granted lightly, but only when intervention is essential to protect 
• Articles Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 u. PITT. 
L. REV. 513, 535-36 (1984). 
2 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (courts 
must enforce the law when enforcement is sought). 
3 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (national security 
outweighed limited harm to water quality; Navy allowed to continue practice bombing without 
water pollution permit). 
4 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311. Temporary injunctions are granted before the merits 
of a case have been tried and, even then, only when the party moving for the injunction will 
likely win on the merits. Conversely, permanent injunctions are granted after a trial on the 
merits. Therefore, the only difference between a permanent and a temporary injunction is 
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rights and property.5 In federal courts, the traditional basis for 
injunctive relief has been irreparable injury coupled with the inad-
equacy of any legal remedy.6 An injunction will issue only when an 
injury cannot be repaired and the legal remedy for the injury would 
be inadequate. 
A concurrent injury, however, usually will result from an injunc-
tion, and usually will be borne by the party opposed to the motion 
for injunctive relief. 7 Therefore, a court, when considering the im-
position of an injunction, must balance the injuries to be suffered by 
each party.8 If this balance favors the moving party, then an injunc-
tion will issue; if this balance favors the opposing party, then an 
injunction will not issue. 
The essence of equity is flexibility, empowering equity courts with 
the authority to shape remedies congruent to the situations at hand.9 
If, for example, persons not associated with a dispute would be 
harmed by an injunction that took effect immediately, then a court 
could, in its discretion, stay the injunction for a short period. 10 
Similarly, if controverted actions had ceased, and if these actions 
were not likely to recur, then a court could, in its discretion, find 
equitable relief to be unnecessary. 11 Finally, a court would not order 
the obviously impossible or the needlessly destructive. 12 
whether or not the merits of the case have been tried. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). But see Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 582 F. Supp. 1489, 
1495 n.l (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggestion that standard of harm 
for issuance of preliminary and permanent injunctions is different). This Comment will not 
distinguish between permanent and temporary injunctions. 
5 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311-12; see Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 
289 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1933); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919). 
6 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312; see also, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 
U.S. 49, 61 (1975). But see Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 687, 726-27 (1990) (concerns other than adequate remedy at law guide courts' decisions 
to grant or deny equitable relief). 
7 See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (the 
Court balanced environmental harm against $70 million spent by oil companies). But see TVA 
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (the Court refused to balance extinction of endangered species 
against abandonment of nearly completed water project in presence of statutory mandate). 
8 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312; see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); 
see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
9 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312; Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329. 
10 See, e.g., Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 628 
F. Supp. 1438, 1444 (D. D.C. 1986) (court stayed injunction 10 days to allow a bank time to 
close commercial paper practice in orderly fashion, apparently to lessen impact upon custom-
ers); see infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. 
11 See, e.g., Hecht, 321 U.S. at 326-28 (the Court noted lower court findings that statutory 
violations had ceased). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Niagara Falls, 706 F. Supp. 1053, 1063-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) 
-------------------------
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This Comment argues that the federal courts do not have the 
discretion to balance the equities when violations of statute occur. 
If the law has been violated, and if those violations likely will con-
tinue, then an injunction against those violations must issue. The 
Supreme Court took this position in one line of cases, which includes 
United States v. City and County of San Francisco13 and Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill. 14 In these cases, the Court enjoined 
the continued violation of congressionally enacted statutes without 
weighing the equities. 15 Similarly, in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc.,16 the Court refused to consider equitable arguments that would 
minimize the impact of the strict interpretation of a statute. 17 To-
gether, these three cases limit the federal courts' discretion to bal-
ance the equities when faced with statutory violations. 
Under a second line of cases, however, the Supreme Court as-
serted the traditional discretionary principles of equity and balanced 
the harms before deciding not to issue an injunction. This second 
line of cases includes Hecht Co. v. Bowles,18 Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo,19 and Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
Alaska. 20 This Comment argues that the Court, in this second line 
of cases, was not performing a traditional balance of the equities but 
actually was performing statutory interpretation. In this second line 
of cases, the Court looked to statute to determine if violations ac-
tually were occurring. 21 Only after a determination that no violations 
had occurred did the Court go on to assert that a balance of the 
equities would be necessary. 
Section II of this Comment sets forth the holdings of both lines of 
Supreme Court cases. Likewise, Section II describes lower federal 
court decisions that apply various interpretations of the holdings of 
these Supreme Court cases. Section III of this Comment explores 
and compares the Supreme Court decisions, their contradictions, 
and their ramifications. Similarly, conflicts among the circuits are 
analyzed. 
(court reluctant to order processing of sewage at a capacity harmful to treatment facility); see 
infra note 109; see also infra note 254. 
J:{ :310 U.S. 16 (1940). 
14 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
15 See id. at 195; United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,32 (1940). 
16 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
17 [d. at 577. 
18 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
19 456 U. S. 305 (1982). 
20 480 U.S. 531 (1987). 
21 See id. at 544; Rornero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 306-12; Hecht, 321 U.S. at 328. 
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Finally, in Section III, this Comment argues that, because of 
conflict and confusion resultant from the contradictory Supreme 
Court decisions, the Court should adopt a single position: if violations 
of statute are likely to occur, then an injunction should issue without 
the traditional balancing of harms. While this position may seem 
overly restrictive, the federal courts nevertheless will retain their 
discretion in the context of statutory interpretation. They will con-
tinue to balance the harms to the parties as part of the statutory 
interpretation process. But this balance will at all times be colored 
by the statute in question. The seeming power of the courts to 
override legislative mandate will then be curtailed. 
II. BACKGROUND: COURT DECISIONS ApPLYING OR REJECTING 
EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Supreme Court 
In three cases, the Supreme Court found a clear statutory limi-
tation on equitable discretion. In all three cases, certain acts were 
prohibited by law, and the Court explicitly refused to allow equitable 
considerations to temper the law. In United States v. City and 
County of San Francisco,22 the federal government sought to enjoin 
San Francisco from reselling electric power generated at facilities 
specifically granted to the city by statute. 23 In shaping the grant, 
Congress explicitly had prohibited the city from reselling electric 
power.24 The Department of the Interior, however, had not enforced 
this prohibition for twenty-four years. 25 The city argued that, in 
equity, the courts could not let the government enforce a law left 
dormant for so long. 26 
In holding for the United States, the Court reasoned that the case 
did not call for a balancing of equities. 27 The provisions of the grant 
clearly declared Congress's policy on the resale of electricity by the 
22 310 u.s. 16 (1940). 
23 Id. at 18-19. 
24 Id. at 26. 
25 See id. at 31. 
26 Id. at 30--31. 
27 Id. at 30. 
Id. 
[Wle are satisfied that this case does not call for a balancing of equities or for the 
invocation of the generalities of judicial maxims in order to determine whether an 
injunction should have issued. The City is availing itself of valuable rights and 
privileges granted by the Government and yet persists in violating the very conditions 
upon which those benefits were granted. 
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city, and equitable arguments should not defeat the enforcement of 
that policy.28 Any other conclusion would require the courts to pass 
judgment on the wisdom of congressional acts. 29 
In a second case, the Court likewise refused to question the wis-
dom of Congress and halted a multi-million dollar water project to 
ensure the statutorily mandated survival of a species of three-inch 
fish, the snail darter. 3D In TVA v. Hill,31 the district court refused 
to grant an injunction against the completion and operation of a dam 
despite the assured destruction of an endangered species' habitat in 
violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).32 The Supreme 
Court, however, held that Congress had made its policy choices 
clear.33 The endangered species legislation took precedence over 
other areas of legislation and it would be beyond the equitable pow-
ers of a court to weigh the value of an endangered species against 
the value of a government project. 34 
Despite equitable arguments against an injunction,35 the Court 
reasoned that equitable discretion should not be used to anticipate 
Congress's reaction to specific events. 36 Courts in equity, when con-
fronted with a statutory mandate, may work only within the bounds 
of the statute. 37 While injunctions should not be granted mechanically 
for every statutory violation,38 if the plain meaning of a statute were 
28 Id. at 30-32. 
29 I d. at 28-29. "It is not the office of the courts to pass upon . . . the efficacy of the 
measures chosen for putting [congressional policy] into effect. Selection of the emphatically 
expressed purpose embodied in this Act was the appropriate business of the legislative body." 
Id. at 26. 
30 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978); see infra notes 31-40 and accompanying 
text. 
31 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
32 Id. at 165-66; Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, instructing the lower court to issue 
an injunction until such time as Congress exempted the dam from the ESA. TVA, 437 U. S. 
at 168. The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court and allowed the injunction to stand. 
Id. at 195. 
33 TVA, 437 U.S. at 194. "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abun-
dantly. clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the 
highest of priorities .... " I d. 
34 See id. at 184, 194-95. "Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the 
order of priorities in a given area, it is ... for the courts to enforce them when enforcement 
is sought." Id. at 194. 
35 Id. at 166-67. The trial court explicated these arguments, which included passage of the 
ESA after substantial construction had already taken place, near completion of the project, 
and Congress's continued appropriations for the dam. Id.; see also Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 
753, 758-60 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
36 TVA, 437 U.S. at 185. 
37 I d. at 194. 
38 I d. at 193. 
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discerned, and the statute found to be constitutional, the judicial 
process would be exhausted. 39 If Congress felt the Court's interpre-
tation were too strict, then Congress could modify the law and allow 
the federal courts greater discretion. 40 
The dissents of Justices Powell and Rehnquist concentrated upon 
statutory construction and the seemingly absurd results of the 
Court's decision. 41 Both Justices would have interpreted the lan-
guage of the Act narrowly and allowed the federal courts to order 
remedies consistent with the broad statutory purposes of the Act. 42 
In a third case, however, Justice Rhenquist, writing for the ma-
jority, refused to look to the broad purposes of an act and instead 
chose to apply the letter of the law. In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
inc. ,43 the owners of a sea going vessel wrongly retained $412.50 of 
a seaman's wages. 44 The seaman brought an action under the Jones 
Act,45 and sought double wages for each day the amount went un-
paid. 46 The strict interpretation of the statute, and the resultant 
windfall to the seaman, were at issue. 47 
In its reasoning, the Supreme Court followed the plain meaning 
of the statute,4il finding no room for equitable discretion in the lan-
guage used by Congress. 49 Despite arguments that the statute's 
broad purpose was remedial and compensatory, and that a windfall 
to the plaintiff was clearly outside the intention of Congress, the 
39 Id. at 194. "Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality 
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor 
are we vested with the power of veto [over congressionallegislationj." Id. at 194-95. 
40 See id. at 194-95. 
41 Id. at 203-04 & n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
The Court professes to find nothing particularly remarkable about the result produced 
by its decision in this case. Because I view it as remarkable indeed, and because I 
can find no hint that Congress actually intended it, ... I am led to conclude that the 
congressional words cannot be given the meaning ascribed to them by the Court. 
Id. at 204 n.14; see id. at 211-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. at 196, 204-05 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 212 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
43 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (decided two months after Romero-Barcelo). 
44 Id. at 567. 
45 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. v 1987). 
46 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 567-68 n.3; see 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1982). The district court used its 
equitable discretion to mitigate the damages and limit the number of days of penalty pay to 
which the seaman was entitled. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 568. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision despite the statutory mandate because of precedent within the 
circuit. Id. at 568-69; Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 664 F.2d 36,40 (5th Cir. 1981). 
47 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 574-76. 
48 Compare id. at 570-71,574-76 (Rehnquist, J., writing for the court) with TVA v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 212-13 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 41-42 and accom-
panying text. 
49 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570. 
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Court held that a literal application of the statute was well within 
Congress's purposes. 50 If a literal application were outside Con-
gress's intent, then Congress would be free to clarify the law. 51 The 
Court refused to recognize the seaman's reemployment as a miti-
gation of damages and allowed the seaman to be awarded 
$302,790.40. 52 
Justice Stevens, dissenting as in Romero-Barcelo,53 pointed to the 
absurdity and injustice of the result. 54 To be faithful to the legislative 
intent, a departure from the statutory text would be necessary. 55 
Further, all judicial discretion would be eliminated by the Court's 
interpretation of the statute. 56 Courts would be required to order an 
automatic, calculated award of damages regardless of the equities of 
the situation. 57 
The following three cases involve decisions by the Supreme Court 
in which equitable discretion was found not to have been curtailed 
or eliminated by clear statutory mandate of Congress. In Hecht Co. 
v. Bowles,58 the government sought an injunction prohibiting a de-
partment store from overcharging its customers in violation of the 
Emergency Price Control Act. 59 The Supreme Court adopted the 
district court's findings that the department store had acted in good 
50 See id. at 570-71. The Court rejected these compensatory arguments and relied upon 
the punitive aspect of the statute. Id. at 572-75. 
51 Id. at 576; cf. TVA, 437 U.S. at 194-95; supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
52 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 575 (majority did not place 
an exact figure on plaintiff's potential award). 
53 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
54 Griffin, 458 U. S. at 586. A case of interest, for which Justice Stevens wrote the majority 
opinion, is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
There, Justice Stevens echoed his sentiments expressed in Romero-Barcelo: when the intent 
of Congress is clear, the courts must give effect to that intent. Id. at 842-43 & n.9. Policy 
arguments are properly addressed to legislators and not to the courts. Id. at 864. Courts are 
neither experts nor legislators and, though they sometimes decide between competing policy 
objectives, they do so objectively and not based upon "personal policy preferences." Id. at 
865. In the end, political responsibility and decision-making rests with the political branches. 
See id. at 866. 
55 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 586. "Moreover, since the result ... in this case is both absurd and 
palpably unjust, this is one of the cases in which the exercise of judgment dictates a departure 
from the literal text in order to be faithful to the legislative will." Id.; cf. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. at 322 (departure from literal interpretation of CWA unnecessary to preserve 
legislative will). 
56 Griffin, 458 U.S. at 589. 
57 Id. 
58 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
59 Id. at 324; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1946) (repealed 
June 30, 1947). 
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faith to correct past violations and was now in substantial compliance 
with the Act. 60 
The Court then interpreted the Act and found within the phrase 
"injunction ... or other order"61 an acknowledgement from Congress 
of the courts' equitable discretion to fashion remedies. 62 The Court 
noted that if Congress had wanted to limit the traditional equitable 
power of the courts, then Congress would have made its language 
unequivocal. 63 Express language from Congress would be needed to 
place equitable discretion out of the reach of the courts. 64 Therefore, 
any ambiguity in the language of the Act would be interpreted in 
favor of equitable discretion. 65 Consistent with this reasoning, the 
court remanded the case and suggested that some remedial order 
would be appropriate. 66 
After a lapse of nearly forty years, the Court again asserted the 
traditional power of equitable discretion in the context of statutory 
enforcement.67 In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,68 a district court 
found that Navy target training off the Puerto Rican coast violated 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act" or 
CWA), which prohibits discharges of munitions into coastal waters 
without a permit.69 The district court, however, did not enjoin the 
60 See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 325. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the 
department store acted in good faith in eventually bringing its prices within the guidelines of 
the Act and that, because the department store was now in compliance, no injunction need 
be issued. [d. at 325-26. The court of appeals reversed, however, finding the Act unequivocal 
in its mandate that an injunction should issue if past violations were proven, regardless of 
current compliance. See id. at 326. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and 
remanded for consideration of whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 
the complaint and not granting some other remedial order. [d. at 328, 331. 
61 The Act stated in pertinent part: "[U]pon a showing by the Administrator that such 
person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices [as constitute a violation 
of] a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted 
without bond." 50 U.S.C. § 925 (repealed June 30, 1947). 
62 See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 328. 
[d. 
It seems apparent on the face of [the Act] that there is some room for the exercise 
of discretion on the part of the court. For the requirement is that a 'permanent or 
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order' be granted. Though the 
Administrator asks for an injunction, some 'other order' might be more 
appropriate .... 
63 [d. at 329. 
64 [d. at 329-30. 
65 [d. at 330. 
66 [d. at 328, 331. 
67 Hecht was decided in 1944 and Romero-Barcelo was decided in 1982. 
68 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
69 [d. at 308-09; see Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 651-52 (D.P.R. 1979). 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) is commonly referred to as the Clean 
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Navy from further discharges, but balanced the equities and allowed 
the Navy to continue its weapons practice while seeking the neces-
sary CWA permit. 70 
The Supreme Court concurred with the district court's reasoning 
that the CWA was meant to protect the environment from actual 
physical harm. 71 Because the Navy discharges were not harming the 
environment, the permitless discharges were merely technical vio-
lations of the CWA and not substantive violations of the broad 
purposes of the Act. 72 Citing TV A for the proposition that the courts 
are not obligated to grant injunctive relief mechanically for every 
statutory violation,73 the Court reasoned that courts are able to 
fashion such remedies as necessary to ensure compliance as long as 
the law in question did not specifically curtail their equitable discre-
tion. 74 Although the Navy was required under the CWA to obtain a 
permit for its discharges, the district court had the discretion to 
allow the Navy to continue its discharges while seeking the permit. 75 
If the Navy were not pursuing a permit, or if a permit were denied 
to the Navy, then the district court would need to reconsider the 
balance of equities. 76 
Water Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Act requires permits 
for all discharges of pollutants from federal facilities. Id. § 1323(a). The Act defines the 
discharge of munitions as pollution. Id. § 1362(6). 
70 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 309-10. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed, finding that the CWA gave an absolute statutory prohibition against discharges 
without a permit. Id. at 310-11; see also Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861-62 (1st 
Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the appeals court for a 
determination of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the injunction. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
71 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314-15. 
72 Id. at 310, 314-15. "The integrity of the Nation's waters, however, not the permit 
process, is the purpose of the FWPCA .... This purpose is to be achieved by compliance 
with the Act, including compliance with the permit requirements. Here, however, the dis-
charge of ordinance had not polluted the waters .... " Id. at 314-15; cf. Public Interest 
Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1167 (D. N.J. 1989) 
(court found defendant's pollution discharges harmful despite existing heavy pollution of 
receiving waterway). 
73 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313; see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,194 (1978); supra note 
38 and accompanying text. 
74 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313-14. "Unless a statute in so many words, or by a 
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope 
of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." Id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner 
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946». 
75 I d. at 320. 
76 Id. 
The District Court did not face a situation in which a permit would very likely not 
issue, and the requirements and objective of the statute could therefore not be 
vindicated if discharges were permitted to continue. Should it become clear that no 
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens warned against the use of equitable 
discretion to undermine public interests as expressed by Congress 
through statute. 77 In all but a very few cases, Justice Stevens rea-
soned, the courts should make a strong presumption in favor of 
enforcing the clear meaning of the law as written by Congress,78 and 
the courts should require the immediate cessation of illegal activity. 79 
By allowing the Navy to continue violating a clear statutory man-
date, the Court was issuing a "judicial permit" and delving into areas 
of policy and national security reserved for administrative agencies 
and for the President. 80 
In the ·final case of this second line, the Court reinforced its holding 
in Romero-Barcelo. 81 In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gam-
bell, Alaska,82 Native Alaskans, utilizing the Alaska National Inter-
est Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),83 sought to enjoin the Sec-
Id. 
permit will be issued and that compliance with the FWPCA will not be forthcoming, 
the statutory scheme and purpose would require the court to reconsider the balance 
it has struck. 
In fact, the government of Puerto Rico declined to issue a permit and further litigation 
ensued. See United States v. Puerto Rico, 551 F. Supp. 864, 865, 869 (1982) (CWA did not 
remove from federal courts jurisdiction over discharge permit appeals); see also Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 315 n.9, 320. The Navy asked the district court to enjoin Puerto Rico 
from refusing to issue approvals that were prerequisite to the issuance of a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the CWA. Puerto Rico, 551 F. Supp. 
at 865; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (an NPDES permit establishes the 
terms and conditions under which pollutants may be discharged). Once jurisdictional problems 
were decided, however, the parties settled out of court. Telephone interview with Marvin B. 
Durning, attorney for the plantiffs in Romero-Barcelo (Mar. 1, 1990) (Navy allowed some 
public use of lands, reduced amount and modified times of bombing, and promised to open 
contracts and jobs to island residents; government of Puerto Rico dropped suit and did not 
pursue court remedies further). 
77 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Id. 
[The majority 1 overlooks the limitations on equitable discretion that apply in cases 
in which public interests are implicated and the defendant's violation of the law is 
ongoing. Of greater importance, the Court's opinion grants an open-ended license to 
federal judges to carve gaping holes in a reticulated statutory scheme designed by 
Congress to protect a precious natural resource from the consequences of ad hoc 
judgments about specific discharges of pollutants. 
78 Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
80 See id. at 324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81 See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544. 
82 480 U.S. 531 (1987); see Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(remand to district court for determination whether plaintiffs possess aboriginal subsistence 
rights to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and whether oil leases would interfere with those 
rights significantly). 
83 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 
(1988). 
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retary of the Interior from leasing parcels of the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) to oil companies for exploration. 84 The Supreme Court 
found no difference between Amoco and Romero-Barcelo. 85 In both 
cases, the lower courts had concentrated upon statutory procedure 
and had missed the underlying substantive policy behind the stat-
ute. 86 Because the Secretary had prepared an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS)87 addressing issues similar to those raised under 
the procedures of ANILCA, he had, in effect, complied with AN-
ILCA.88 Moreover, the balance of harms-possible but unlikely in-
terference with subsistence uses versus the loss of seventy million 
dollars already invested by the oil companies-required the courts 
to deny injunctive relief. 89 Congress did not establish that subsis-
tence uses were more important than oil exploration; Congress had 
merely identified subsistence uses as important, requiring their rec-
onciliation with other competing public interests. 90 
The above three Supreme Court cases, Hecht, Romero-Barcelo, 
and Amoco, embody a traditional equitable approach to the discern-
ment of the requirements of an injunction. Contrary to the Court's 
>l4 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 535. The district court denied the Alaskans' motion for preliminary 
injunction despite finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits because the balance of 
the equities tipped in favor of the nation's need for energy independence. Id. at 539-40. The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and granted a 
preliminary injunction, reasoning that Congress had already balanced competing policy con-
cerns and had intended to protect Alaskan subsistence rights above other national interests. 
See id. at 540-41; Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1426 n.2, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The Supreme Court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the Ninth 
Circuit. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 555. The court of appeals subsequently found that the native 
Alaskans had retained their aboriginal rights and remanded the case to the district court. 
Village of Gambell, 869 F.2d at 1280. The district court currently is considering whether the 
native Alaskans' aboriginal rights apply to the OCS and if so, whether oil company exploration 
will interfere with these rights. Id. 
85 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544. 
"" [d. The Court's reasoning, however, had less to do with the balance of equities than with 
statutory interpretation: the Court went on to find that ANILCA did not apply to the OCS, 
eliminating any need for hearings by the Secretary of the Interior. See id. at 546-55; see also 
id. at 555-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgement); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 
502 (1st Cir. 1989), rev'g, 701 F. Supp. 886, 896 n.ll (D. Me. 1988). 
The Court also noted that harm to the environment is often irreparable. Therefore, if injury 
is sufficiently likely, the balance of equities will usually tip in favor of the issuance of an 
injunction. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545. 
87 An EIS is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment." Id. § 4332(c). 
88 See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 539-40, 544. 
89 [d. at 545; cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978) (Supreme Court enjoined operation 
of dam despite congressional appropriations in excess of one hundred million dollars). 
90 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545-46. 
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approach in TV A, San Francisco, and Griffin, the traditional equi-
table approach would allow violations of statute to continue. This 
conflict between approaches of the Supreme Court has affected the 
consistency of lower federal court decisions involving statutes and 
injunctions. The inconsistencies are explored below. 
B. The Federal District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal 
The federal trial and appeals courts of the District of Columbia, 
First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have considered 
cases involving equity and statutes. 91 Because of the large number 
of cases involving the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
those cases are considered as a group separate from those cases that 
deal with other statutes. 
1. The Application of Equitable Discretion by the Lower Federal 
Courts to the National Environmental Policy Act 
a. The First Circuit 
The first case of interest decided by the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, Massachusetts v. Watt,92 is controlling precedent for 
NEPA violations in the circuit. 93 The Department of the Interior 
appealed from an injunction prohibiting the auction of oil drilling 
rights in the North Atlantic until a Supplemental Environmental 
Impact Statement (SEIS) could be prepared. 94 Upholding the in-
junction,95 the court of appeals reasoned that, although impact state-
ments would not in themselves stop harm to the environment, de-
cision-makers relying upon accurate impact statements likely would 
avoid some environmental harm. 96 The court distinguished NEPA 
91 See infra notes 92-225 and accompanying text. The courts for the Federal, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Eight and Tenth Circuits have not considered cases on point. 
92 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
93 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 497-98 (1st Cir. 1989); see infra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
94 Massachusetts, 716 F.2d at 947-48; see Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 
561,569-71 (D. Mass. 1983). An SEIS was required under NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) 
(1982). 
95 Massachusetts, 716 F.2d at 953. 
96 I d. at 952. 
Id. 
NEP A is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it foresees 
that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good reasons. 
Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process; its aim is to make 
government officials notice environmental considerations and take them into account. 
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from the CWA as interpreted by Romero-Barcelo. 97 While the goal 
of the CWA was clean water, the focus of NEP A was information-
gathering for decision-making. 98 Harm to the environment from vi-
olations of the CWA permit process was readily discernible; harm 
to the environment from poor decision-making due to lack of relevant 
information might be difficult to foresee. 99 Although injunctions 
would not flow automatically from violations of NEP A, the balance 
of possible harms supported the trial court's grant of injunctive 
relief. 100 
The court of appeals reasserted this NEPA precedent in Sierra 
Club v. Marsh. lOl This case involved an attempt by the Army Corps 
of Engineers (Corp) to build a dry cargo terminal on a deserted 
island off the coast of Maine. 102 In its decision, the court of appeals 
distinguished Amoco, finding procedural checks upon administrative 
decisions in ANILCA that were not present in NEPA.103 
The only harm that NEPA could guard against was lack of infor-
mation in making environmentally important decisions. 104 If NEPA 
procedures were thwarted and the necessary data for making an 
informed decision were lacking, then the harm would be irrepara-
ble. 105 In ANILCA, however, the statute provided for later substan-
tive agency review of the impact of oil exploration on subsistence 
uses. 106 This availability of further review likewise allowed the courts 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See id. 
100 I d. at 952-53. 
101 872 F.2d 497, 499 (lst Cir. 1989). The court of appeals vacated the lower court's decision 
and remanded the case for further consideration. Id. at 505. In the original trial, the district 
court denied plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction despite strong proof of NEPA 
violations. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 701 F. Supp. 886, 891-94 (D. Me. 1988). The district 
court reasoned that Amoco undercut controlling NEPA precedent in the First Circuit. Id. at 
895 ("It is impossible to escape the conclusion that Amoco severly undercuts [Massachusetts 
v. Watt)."); cf. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (lst Cir. 1983); supra notes 96-100 
and accompanying text. Only irreparable injury-as decided by balancing the harms under 
the court's equitable discretion-would be enough for an injunction to be issued. Sierra Club, 
701 F. Supp. at 897. "Amoco ... appears to preclude preliminary injunctive relief predicated 
on a likely NEPA violation unaccompanied by a showing of irreparable environmental injury." 
Id. (footnote omitted). Because the claimed NEPA violations were merely procedural, and 
the harm to the environment from the construction could be reversed, there was no basis for 
an injunction while an SEIS was being prepared. See id. at 898-99. 
102 Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 498. 
103 I d. at 503. 
104 See id. at 503-04. 
105 See id. "[Tlhe risk implied by a violation of NEPA is that real environmental harm will 
occur through inadequate foresight and deliberation." Id. at 504. 
106 See id. at 503. 
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greater discretion in deciding upon the irreversibility of harms. 107 
The court of appeals instructed the trial court to consider the actual 
harm to the environment should the project be built only to be torn 
down as a result of possible negative findings of the SElS.l08 
b. The Second Circuit 
Sierra Club v. Hennessyl09 involved a NEPA challenge to the 
Westway highway project in New York City,uo The trial court di-
rected the Corps to prepare and circulate an SElS and enjoined the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) from reimbursing New 
107 [d. 
[l]n the case of ANILCA, unlike NEPA, if (for example) the initial decision unrea-
sonably harms subsistence uses, the [statute] will require the agency to change 
direction .... For that reason, the injury that ever-growing bureaucratic commitment 
to a project can work may prove to be 'irreparable harm' in a NEPA case in a sense 
not present in an ANILCA case. 
[d. (parenthetical and emphasis in original). 
108 [d. at 504. Duly admonished, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Sierra 
Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 593 (D. Me 1989), dismissed, 907 F.2d 210, 215 (1990). 
Following the suggestions of the court of appeals, the trial court found that NEPA indeed 
implements a legislative determination that the public interest is best served when agency 
officials have the data necessary to make informed decisions. [d. at 592-93. The court further 
reasoned that, when environmental harm from lack of information seems sufficiently likely, 
an injunction should be granted. [d. at 592. Finding both of these elements present, the trial 
court enjoined further work on the project pending compliance with NEPA requirements. [d. 
at 593. 
109 695 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1982). A more recent decision in the Second Circuit, United States 
v. Niagara Falls, 706 F. Supp. 1053 (W.D.N. Y. 1989), addressed injunctive relief under the 
CWA. In Niagara Falls, a district court permanently enjoined the city of Niagara Falls from 
continuing discharges of untreated sewage in violation of the CWA and the city's NPDES 
permit. [d. at 1053; United States v. Niagara Falls, 674 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (W.D.N. Y. 1987); 
see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1342(a) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). In shaping a remedy, however, the 
court took technical aspects of waste disposal into consideration and allowed the city to 
continue dumping those effluviums that exceeded the capacity of its sewage treatment system. 
Niagara Falls, 706 F. Supp. at 1062-64. After reviewing Romero-Barcelo and Amoco, the 
court concluded that injunctive relief could not be granted mechanically and that the underlying 
purposes of the CWA had to be taken into consideration. [d. at 1058-59. 
Although the city clearly was violating the underlying purposes of the CWA in a way that 
required an injunction, the court nevertheless found that equitable discretion encompassed 
the fashioning of appropriate remedies beyond the mere granting or denial of relief. [d. at 
1059, 1064. Forcing the city to process sewage at capacities harmful to the treatment system 
would have been imprudent, with the potential for harming the treatment facilities. [d. at 
1064. The court, in its equitable discretion, allowed the continued discharge of sewage that 
exceeded the safe capacity of the treatement system, even though these discharges violated 
the limits set in the city's NPDES permit. [d. at 1064. 
110 Hennessy, 695 F.2d at 645; cf. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
732 F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (appeals court admonished trial court to pay attention to the 
law; the law expressed Congress's intent and should not be contravened lightly; if care were 
not taken, the trial court could intrude into the legislative domain). 
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York State for lands acquired for the project. 111 The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed the injunction against the FHWA,112 
reasoning that the reimbursement was merely ministerial and would 
not threaten the objectivity of New York State in its participation 
in the preparation of the SEIS.ll3 Therefore, only negligible harm 
to the NEPA decision-making process might occur, as opposed to 
the substantial economic harm surely to be suffered by the state if 
funds were withheld. 114 
An equitable balance of harms also was required by the court of 
appeals in Huntington v. Marsh,115 when a trial court's permanent 
injunction was vacated for lack of equitable balancing. 116 The court 
of appeals concurred with the trial court that the Corps, in desig-
nating an underwater dump site in Long Island Sound for dredged 
material, had violated NEPA by filing an incomplete EIS.ll7 Never-
theless, the court cited Romero-Barcelo for the proposition that, 
even if statutory violations clearly were present, an equitable bal-
ance of the harms would be required. 118 The court remanded the 
case for determination of the necessity for injunctive relief using 
traditional equitable principles. 119 
c. The Seventh Circuit 
In Wisconsin v. Weinberger,120 the state of Wisconsin sought pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions against the Defense Depart-
111 Hennessy, 695 F.2d at 646. 
112 Id. at 650. 
113 Id. at 647-48. "In all those decisions that have reviewed alleged violations of NEPA, 
the courts that have granted injunctions have expressly prohibited the future acquisition of a 
right-of-way .... In our case the property has already been acquired by the State .... " Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
114 Id. at 649-50. 
115 859 F.2d 1134 (2d Cir. 1988). 
116 Id. at 1143. 
117 Id. at 1135, 1142-43. 
118 Id. at 1143. "[IJnjunctive.relief does not follow automatically upon a finding of statutory 
violations, including environmental violations. On the contrary, '[aln injunction should issue 
only where the intervention of a court of equity is essential in order effectually to protect 
property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.'" Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting in part Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 
(1919))). 
119 Id. at 1143. On remand, the district court again failed to balance the equities before 
issuing an injunction. See Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 649 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in deciding the second appeal, 
reiterated the importance of balancing the actual physical harms and not the violations of the 
law or the possible harms. Id. at 654. Evidence of actual damage would be necessary before 
a permanent injunction could issue. Id. 
120 582 F. Supp. 1489 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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ment's Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) project until an SEIS, 
addressing new research into extremely low-frequency radiation, 
could be prepared. 121 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
overturned the trial court,122 distinguished TVA, 123 and observed 
that NEP A was merely procedural in scope and was meant only to 
supplement the decision-making process. 124 Unlike the congression-
ally defined harm that would result from a violation of the ESA,125 
no congressionally defined harm would result from the NEP A vio-
lation. 126 The new information involving extremely low-frequency 
radiation was inconclusive; the ELF project had complied fully with 
121 Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 414; Wisconsin, 582 F. Supp. at 1491. 
122 The trial court granted an injunction, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1365 (1984), and later denied 
the Defense Department's motion to vacate. Wisconsin, 582 F. Supp. at 1491-92, 1496. The 
trial court reasoned that, unlike the CWA violations in Romero-Barcelo when an injunction 
would not further the purposes of Congress, the intent of Congress as embodied in NEPA 
could be furthered only by an injunction. [d. at 1493-94; cf. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314; 
supra notes 69, 72-74 and accompanying text. The harm to be guarded against was not actual 
physical harm to the environment, but harm to the decision-making process as required by 
NEPA. Wisconsin, 582 F. Supp. at 1494. "[Wlhen federal officials make a decision without 
first evaluating its environmental consequences, the harm that the Act is intended to prevent 
has been suffered." [d. (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983»; see 
supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
The trial court further found that, just as Congress had foreclosed equitable discretion 
under the ESA, Congress had foreclosed equitable discretion under NEPA. Wisconsin, 582 
F. Supp. at 1493-94; see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); supra notes 34-39 and 
accompanying text. "In much the same way that it has chosen to preserve endangered species, 
Congress has chosen to impose a decision-making process on federal agencies by enacting the 
National Environmental Policy Act." Wisconsin, 582 F. Supp. at 1494. "[Ilt is clear that a 
court's discretion to decline to issue an injunction is strictly confined by the purposes and 
language of the Act." [d. at 1495. A balance of the equities-national security versus congres-
sional environmental policies-was not within the power of the courts. See id. "I conclude 
that, when an action is being undertaken in violation of the National Envirnmental Policy 
Act, there is a presumption that injunctive relief should be granted prohibiting continuation 
of the action until the agency brings itself into compliance." [d. at 1495. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the trial court's injunction, 736 F.2d 
438 (7th Cir. 1984), and reversed the trial court in a later opinion. Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 
428. 
123 Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 425. 
124 [d. "NEPA cannot be construed to elevate automatically its procedural requirements 
above all other national considerations." [d. 
125 See id. at 426; TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978); supra notes 33-34 and accompanying 
text. The court found significant Congress's unequivocal ban on the destruction of a species 
via the destruction of its critical habitat. Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 426. 
126 Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 426. 
The only irreparable injury under NEPA if the Navy were permitted to proceed 
with Project ELF, as perceived by the district court, was that it would later lead to 
biased decision-making by the Navy .... Although the goal of NEPA is to force 
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of major federal actions . . . 
that goal is not to be achieved at the expense of a total disregard for countervailing 
public interests. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
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NEPA in the past; and, because the ELF project was at a late stage 
of construction, the decision-making process protected by NEPA 
would not be harmed further by continuing work. 127 The court of 
appeals overturned the trial court's presumption in favor of injunc-
tive relief, reasoning that, absent a mandate from Congress, the 
courts always must balance the equities. 128 
d. The Ninth Circuit 
The first case of interest from this circuit is Save the Yaak Com-
mittee v. Block. 129 In Save the Yaak, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and granted an injunction 
under NEPA to stop the reconstruction of the Yaak River Road and 
associated logging on national forest lands in Montana. 130 Citing 
Amoco for the proposition that proof of irreparable harm was nec-
essary before an injunction could issue,131 the court of appeals 
weighed the probable harms that could result from the Forest Ser-
vice's decision not to prepare an EIS.132 The court found evidence 
that grizzly bear and caribou populations might be affected adversely 
by Forest Service actions. 133 Further, the court could find no coun-
tervailing harm to the defendant or to third parties that might tip 
the equitable balance against the injunction. 134 
127 See id. at 422-24, 427. 
128 See id. at 424-25. 
129 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988). There is an additional NEPA case of interest from the 
Ninth Circuit. In Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC) v. Marsh, 677 F. Supp. 1072 
(D. Or. 1987), the district court considered the problem of designing an injunction under 
NEPA to halt the construction of a partially completed dam. [d. at 1073. The district court 
originally had held that no injunction was required. ONRC v. Marsh, 626 F. Supp. 1557, 1569 
(D. Or. 1986), rev'd, 832 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989). In fashioning 
this relief, the district court allowed construction of the dam to continue until a certain level 
was reached. ONRC, 677 F. Supp. at 1075. The court also allowed certain other ancillary 
construction activities at the dam to be completed. [d. at 1078. The court balanced the equities 
and found that the safety of people downstream required the stabilization of the structure 
and that the harm to the environment would be greater if the ancillary construction were 
incomplete. [d. at 1074, 1076, 1078. 
Under the balance I have struck, first in importance is the safety of the children who 
attend school immediately downstream, and of those who reside nearby. Their lives 
and property would be in danger if a flood were to ensue, as feared-properly, in my 
view-by the defendants, if no elevation of the structure were permitted. 
[d. at 1078. In exercising its discretion, the court noted but did not analyze a tension between 
Romero-Barcelo and Amoco on the one hand, and Ninth Circuit controlling precedent on the 
other. [d. at 1077. 
130 Save the Yaak, 840 F.2d at 716, 722. 
131 See id. at 722. 
132 See id. at 717-19. 
133 I d. at 722. 
134 ld. 
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The balance of harms in Sierra Club v. United States Forest 
Service (USFS)l35 caused the court of appeals to reverse a district 
court's denial of a preliminary injunction. 136 The court of appeals 
found that irreparable harm not only could occur from the timber 
harvests in question, but that irreparable harm already had oc-
curred. 137 The Forest Service's Environmental Assessments (EA) 
were erroneous in finding that no significant harm would result from 
modified clear cutting around giant sequoias. 138 As a matter of law, 
an EIS should have been prepared. 139 The balance of harms required 
by Amoco favored the issuance of the injunction. 140 
Likewise, in People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Marsh,l41 an EA 
issued by the Corps stated that a plan to fill an area of wetlands 
near an airport would not require an EIS.142 Even though the Corps 
had evaluated the impact to the environment in internal documents 
and for the administrative record,143 the district court found these 
evaluations unreasonable in light of several aspects left unex-
plored. 144 For each unexplored aspect, the court weighed the likeli-
hood of environmental injury.145 Finding a substantial overall like li-
135 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988). 
136 [d. at 1196. 
137 [d. at 1195-96. "[T)he Sierra Club has made a factual showing not that environmental 
injury is likely, but that is [sic) has occurred." [d. at 1195. 
It is our understanding that at this time, harvesting in the Cabin and Solo sales has 
been completed .... [H)arvesting in the Peyrone sale is eighty percent complete and 
in the Camp sale, thirty-nine percent complete. . . . In each of the Peyrone and 
Camp sales, two cutting units with giant sequoias remain .... [H)arvesting [in) the 
Lion sale is thirty-three percent complete; in the Church sale, eighty-five percent 
complete; and in the Eye sale, forty-three percent complete .... Tie and Snow sales 
presently are on administrative appeal. 
[d. at 1196 n.4. 
138 Bare mineral soil, produced by the burning of ground cover and lesser trees, is necessary 
for giant sequoia reproduction. [d. at 1194. Modified clear cutting would remove all vegetation 
(except the giant sequoias themselves) and thereby endanger reproduction and the future 
existence of the sequoia groves in question. [d. An EA is prepared to determine whether an 
EIS is necessary and is required by NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). 
139 USFS, 843 F.2d at 1191; see id. at 1193-96. 
140 Id. at 1195. "[W)hen environmental injury is 'sufficiently likely ... the balance of harms 
will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.'" [d. (quoting 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)); see supra note 86. 
141 687 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
142 [d. at 497. The EPA initially recommended that an EIS be prepared, but later found 
the project to be environmentally satisfactory. [d. 
143 [d. 
144 See id. at 501. The aspects left unexplored by the Corps included consideration of 
alternatives to the project, environmental impact on wetlands and wetland denizens, water 
pollution from rain water runoff, and the cumulative impact of this project with other projects 
in the area. [d. at 499-501. 
145 See id. 
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hood that the Corps had neglected to include various environmental 
injuries in its assessment, the court vacated the dredge-and-fill per-
mit issued by the Corps, continued an injunction already in effect, 
and remanded the matter to the Corps for further study.146 As in 
Save the Yaak, the court cited Amoco for the proposition that en-
vironmental harm is often irreparable. 147 
Similarly, the district court in Morgan v. Walter148 held that en-
vironmental harm is often irreparable. 149 In Morgan, a private land-
owner sought to construct and operate a fish hatchery on public 
lands in Idaho. 150 Neighboring landowners sought an injunction 
against the construction, claiming that the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (BLM) had created a flawed EIS.151 
After an extensive exploration of the probable harms unaddressed 
in the EIS,152 the court found for the plaintiffs and issued an injunc-
tion. 15:3 The court, however, only reluctantly issued the order. 154 
Greater harm to the environment could occur if the defendant land-
owner decided to build the fish hatchery on his own private land, 
circumventing any moderations required by the EIS.155 Neverthe-
less, the court held that an injunction was required in light of the 
violations of NEPA and the potential harm to the environment. 156 
2. The Application of Equitable Discretion by the Lower Federal 
Courts to Non-NEPA Cases 
a. The District of Columbia Circuit 
In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System,157 a private organization, the Securities 
Industry Association, forced the Federal Reserve System to stop a 
bank from selling commercial paper in violation of sections 16 and 
146 Id. at SOL 
147 I d.; see supra note 86. 
14H 728 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Idaho 1989). 
149 Id. at 1494. 
1.'0 Id. at 1484-85. 
151 Id. at 1486. 
152 I d. at 1488-92. 
1,;;1 Id. at 1495. 
154 Id. at 1494. "Although the court must issue the preliminary injunction pursuant to the 
standards which the law imposes, it does so with great reservation." Id. 
105 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 628 F. Supp. 1438 (D. D.C. 1986). 
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21 of the Banking Act. 158 The court found for the Association and 
issued a permanent injunction against the bank. 159 The court rea-
soned that, because the bank was violating federal law, it was acting 
contrary to the public interest. 16o Because the bank's request to 
continue an illegal activity was extraordinary, the showing of irre-
parable harm on behalf of the bank would have to have been over-
whelming to avoid an injunction. 161 Nevertheless, the court allowed 
the bank ten days from the date of the decision to get its affairs in 
order and phase out its commercial paper services in a reasonable 
fashion. 162 
The district court rejected a similar attempt to use equitable 
discretion to defeat the enforcement of statute in American Hawaii 
Cruises v. Skinner. 163 In this case, the Coast Guard granted a coast-
ing license to the owners of a rebuilt cruise ship.164 Competitors 
sought an injunction against the use of the vessel in coastal waters, 
claiming that the rebuild was done in violation of the Jones Act. 165 
Citing Romero-Barcello, the defendants asked the court to balance 
the harms in their favor and deny the injunction. 166 The court de-
clined to balance the harms and distinguished Romero-Barcelo: while 
the CWA implicitly allowed discretion, the Jones Act did not. 167 
Further, the balance of economic harms did not favor the defendants 
clearly. 168 
b. The First Circuit 
In Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc.,169 the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied upon the reasoning of 
Romero-Barcelo and Hecht to decide antitrust claims under the Clay-
158 Id. at 1440; see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 627 F. Supp. 695, 711 
(D.D.C. 1986); Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378(a)(1) (l988) (commonly known as 
the Glass-Steagall Act). 
159 Securities Industry, 628 F. Supp. at 1444. 
160 Id. at 1442. 
161 Id. 
162 I d. at 1444. 
163 713 F. Supp. 452 (D. D.C. 1989), dismissed, 893 F.2d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
164 Id. at 454. A coasting license is a license to operate in coastal waters. 
165 Id. at 454-55; see Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. v 1987). 
166 Skinner, 713 F. Supp. at 459. 
167 Id. at 459-60. 
168 Id. at 460. The court went on to interpret the section of the Jones Act in question and 
to review the Coast Guard's decision in light of that interpretation. Id. at 460-64. Finding 
the Coast Guard's decision to grant the license unsubstantiated, the court remanded the case 
back to the agency and dismissed the action. Id. at 468-69. No injunction was issued. Id. at 
469. 
169 754 F.2d 404 (lst Cir. 1985). 
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ton Act. 170 An independent gasoline vendor sought the divestiture 
of a competitor's acquired assets. 171 The trial court denied plaintiff's 
motion for permanent injunction, holding that the Act limited di-
vestitures to actions brought by public agencies.172 The court of 
appeals reversed this decision and remanded for further delibera-
tion.173 The court of appeals could find no limitation on equitable 
discretion in the Clayton Act. Therefore, courts could exercise their 
inherent equitable powers in fashioning relief under the Act, poten-
tially including divestiture of offending assets. 174 
c. The Second Circuit 
An exercise of the courts' equitable powers was foreclosed by 
statute in New York v. Gorsuch. 175 The district court found that the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had 
failed to conform to a statutory timetable176 in promulgating emission 
standards for inorganic arsenic under the Clean Air Act (CAA).177 
The Administrator had appealed to the court's equitable discretion 
and had cited Romero-Barcelo and TV A for the proposition that 
injunctive relief need not be granted mechanically for statutory vi-
olations. 178 The court, however, citing these same cases, reasoned 
that Congress may limit a court's equitable discretion through sta-
tutory mandate. 179 The court found that Congress already had bal-
anced the need for prompt regulation against the need for well-
170 Id. at 416-17; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27 (1988); see supra notes 
63-66,74-76 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently approved of this reasoning 
in California v. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1859 (1990). 
171 Cia. Petrolera, 754 F.2d at 406-07. 
172 See id. at 406. 
173 [d. at 430. 
174 See id. at 416-17. "[WJe believe Congress intended that courts should fashion their 
injunctions by exercising sound discretion according to the exigencies of the particular situation 
before them, which is to allow courts their 'traditional equitable discretion.'" Id. at 417 (quoting 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982»; see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 
(1988); cf. supra notes 63-66, 74-76 and accompanying text. 
175 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N. Y. 1983). 
176 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982). 
177 Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. at 1062; see CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
178 See Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. at 1062-63. The Administrator felt that more time was 
necessary to allow for the gathering of the best statistical information possible. Id. at 1065. 
The Administrator argued that compliance with the Act was "impossible" under the circum-
stances. Id. at 1064. 
179 See id. at 1062-63. "While in the normal instance I would defer to the wisdom of the 
Administrator, I cannot when Congress has so clearly spoken on the issue .... Accordingly, 
I find that the Administrator should be compelled to comply with the statutory mandate." Id. 
at 1066 (emphasis added). 
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informed standards and had chosen prompt regulation. 180 If the Ad-
ministrator needed more time, reasoned the court, then she should 
appeal to Congress to amend the law and not appeal to equitable 
discretion. 181 The court ordered a permanent injunction requiring 
the EPA to publish standards within 180 days. 182 
d. The Third Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 183 likewise strictly interpreted the 
CAA 184 in reversing a district court decision to stay enforcement of 
the Act. 185 The trial court had exercised its equitable discretion, 
weighed the circumstances of the defendant company,186 and found 
that the company need not comply with deadline dates mandated by 
the CAA. 187 The court of appeals, however, looked to the language 
and purpose of the statute and found that the deadlines had been 
set by Congress with deliberation and without qualification. 188 There-
fore, the statute eliminated any exercise of discretion by the court. 189 
The court of appeals further precluded any balance of the equities 
by finding that, while the public's economic interests might be en-
hanced by the continued operation of the plant in question, Congress 
already had balanced public policy and had found clean air to be the 
predominant concern. 190 Citing TV A, the court reasoned, a fortiori, 
180 ld. at 1064. 
181 ld. at 1066. "If the Administrator disagrees with the burden Congress has imposed upon 
her Agency, her proper recourse is to persuade Congress to amend the statute, not to defy 
the statute and seek relief from the courts." ld. 
182 I d. at 1066. 
183 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987). 
184 See id. at 1083-84; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(A) (1982). 
185 Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 818 F.2d at 1089. 
186 The circumstances included bankruptcy, a 98-day strike, financial losses, and a change 
in management. I d. at 1082. 
187 ld. at 1081-82. The defendant operated a sinter windbox in connection with its steel 
manufacturing facilities. ld. at 1079. Installation of pollution control equipment was required 
no later than three years from the date of EPA approval of state pollution standards. See id. 
at 1079-80; CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1982). 
183 See Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 818 F.2d at 1083-84. 
189 ld. at 1084. "It is evident therefore from the language of the statute and its legislative 
history that Congress placed great significance on the compliance dates and intended to limit, 
if not entirely eliminate, the district court's equitable discretion to extend compliance." I d. 
190 I d. at 1088. 
ld. 
While continued operation of steel facilities may advance a state's economic interest, 
the Clean Air Act reflects a congressional policy decision that removal of pollutants 
from the air which endanger the lives and health of the populace is a more compelling 
public interest. The district court was not authorized to impose its own balancing of 
policy over that of Congress. 
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that if Congress had limited equitable discretion in deference to the 
snail darter, then certainly Congress had limited equitable discretion 
in deference to healthy air. 191 
In United States v. Vineland Chemical Co., 192 the defendant's 
hazardous waste dump had not met EPA certification standards 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(RCRA)193 within the time periods set by law. 194 The defendant 
invoked equitable defenses citing Romero-Barcelo. 195 The district 
court, however, permanently enjoined the defendant from continuing 
toxic waste disposal. 196 The court ackl)owledged the defendant's as-
tute use of Romero-Barcelo-if traditional equitable powers could 
be used to enforce a statute, then traditional equitable defenses 
likewise should be allowed-yet distinguished Romero-Barcelo 
nevertheless. 197 While the Supreme Court had affirmed the use of 
equitable discretion to secure compliance with the law, the defendant 
was attempting to use equitable discretion to defeat enforcement of 
the law. 198 
e. The Seventh Circuit 
A subsequent district court case from the Seventh Circuit found 
just such a mandate from Congress. In Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Outboard Marine COrp.,199 a manufacturer was proved 
to be discharging toxins into navigable waters in violation of its 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) per-
mit. 20o In deciding to enjoin further discharges permanently, the 
district court cited Romero-Barcelo, noting that courts are not ob-
ligated automatically to enjoin statutory violations. 201 Nevertheless, 
the court proceeded to apply a lower-threshold standard for the 
191 Id. 
192 692 F. Supp. 415 (D. N.J. 1988). 
193 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(j) (1982 & 
Supp. v 1987). 
194 Vineland, 692 F. Supp. at 417; see RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) (Supp. v 1987). 
195 Vineland, 692 F. Supp. at 423. 
196 Id. at 417,424. 
197 I d. at 423. 
198 Id. "[T]he [Romero-Barcelo] court, by its own description, affirmed a district court's 
exercise of equitable power to 'secure prompt compliance' with federal law .... This is a very 
different exercise of equitable power from that which defendants request here, where an 
enforcement action is sought to be defeated on equitable grounds." Id. (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982». 
199 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
200 Id. at 804, 824; see supra note 76 (definition of NPDES permit). 
201 Outboard Marine, 692 F. Supp. at 822; see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305, 313 (1982); supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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injunction, reasoning that, because the injunction was authorized by 
statute, a plaintiff need only prove a reasonable likelihood of future 
violations. 202 
f. The Ninth Circuit 
In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel,203 a Native American tribe 
appealed the modification of the enjoinment of the nearby mining of 
coal from leases issued by the Secretary of the Interior. 204 The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the application of NEPA 
and the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) to the 
leases. 205 The court held that both acts were similar to the CWA, as 
interpreted in Romero-Barcelo, and unlike the ESA as interpreted 
in TVA. 206 NEPA and the FCLAA did not limit the courts' traditional 
equitable powers. 207 The substantive underlying policy of the acts in 
question would continue to be served if the leases were suspended 
202 Outboard Marine, 692 F. Supp. at 822. "When Congress expressly authorizes such 
injunctive relief, that brings into playa different set of factors from those in the court-created 
setting .... 'Once a violation is demonstrated, the moving party need show only that there 
is some reasonable likelihood of future violations.'" [d. (quoting CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 
1220 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979»; see CWA, 33 U.S.C § 1365(a) (1982 & Supp. 
V 1987) (authorizes citizen suits seeking enforcement against CWA violators). 
203 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988). There is an additional case of interest from the Ninth 
Circuit. In American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision not to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion despite the plaintiff's probable success on the merits. [d. at 964-65, 967. The Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) had attempted to implement a land management plan for the 
California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA), but had substantially failed to follow public 
comment and planning procedures required by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976 (FLPMA). [d. at 963-64; see FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1781(d) (1982). Despite these 
violations of law, however, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that 
the balance of the equities favored implementation of the plan because the harm resultant 
from the BLM's procedural violations was less than the environmental injury that FLPMA 
was intended to prevent. Watt, 714 F.2d at 966. Further, the appeals court noted that under 
Romero-Barcelo, the public interest also must be weighed when considering the issuance of 
an injunction. [d. at 967. The public interest in this case was best served by implementing 
the flawed plan and protecting the environment. See id. at 966. 
204 Cheyenne, 851 F.2d at 1154-55. 
205 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S. C.). 
206 See Cheyenne, 851 F.2d at 1156. 
207 See id. at 1156-58. "[NEPA's] high aim 'to create and maintain conditions under which 
man and nature can exist in productive harmony,' 42 U.S.C. § 4331, does not show a congres-
sional intent to foreclose equitable balancing by a court enforcing its requirements." [d. at 
1158. "We accordingly focus 'on the underlying substantive policy' that Congress designed the 
statute to effect .... Nothing in the Act[s] indicates that Congress intended to restrict the 
court's jurisdiction in equity." [d. at 1156 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987»; cf. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (1982). 
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and not voided. 208 Further, because the modifications to the EIS 
were relatively minor, there was no danger that "bureaucratic com-
mitment" would impair these impact statements if the leases were 
suspended rather than voided. 209 
Conversely, in Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy,210 the 
court of appeals looked to the ESA as interpreted in TV A and found 
that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)211 included 
similar limitations on equitable discretion. 212 The plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin the Navy's Carrier Battle Group Homeport project near Ev-
erett, Washington, because the state Shorelines Hearing Board had 
not approved a shoreline permit as required by the NDAA.213 The 
court of appeals found that Congress had provided only one method 
to enforce compliance with the NDAA: any construction would halt 
until all federal, state,. and local permits were acquired. 214 The 
208 Cheyenne, 851 F.2d at 1156. "Congress's underlying substantive policy concern was to 
develop the coal resources in an environmentally sound manner. This purpose lays as much 
stress on . . . developing the coal resources as it does on the environmental effects of 
development." [d. 
209 [d. at 1156-57; cf Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1983); supra 
notes 92-lO0 and accompanying text. The court of appeals found that the district court had 
abused its discretion by balancing the equities on an inadequate record. Cheyenne, 851 F.2d 
at 1158. While the lower court was not required by NEPA or the FCLAA to issue an 
injunction, the mining was going forward under a fundamentally flawed EIS and an injunction 
might be appropriate after a balance of the harms. [d. at 1157-58. 
210 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.), modified, 850 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1988). 
211 National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 
lOO-180, lOl Stat. lO19 (1987). 
212 Navy, 841 F.2d at 933. "As in TVA ... an examination of the language, history, and 
structure of the NDAA demonstrates that Congress intended that no construction should 
commence prior to issuance of all required permits." [d.; see NDAA, Pub. L. No. lOO-180, 
§ 2322(c), lOl Stat. at 1219. 
[d. 
Funds appropriated [for the Homeport project] ... may not be obligated or expended 
for such purpose until- (A) all Federal, State, and local permits required for the 
dredging activities to be carried out ... have been issued, including all permits 
required pursuant to, or otherwise in connection with, the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. 
213 Navy, 841 F.2d at 928-30. The city of Everett had issued the permit, but the state 
Shorelines Hearings Board had not completed its review when the Navy contracted to begin 
construction. The plaintiffs sued to halt construction until the permit received final approval. 
The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction for failure to 
establish irreparable harm and for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed, holding 
that the trial court had abused its discretion in withholding injunctive relief. [d. at 930-31, 
937. 
214 [d. at 929, 934. "The NDAA limits the discretion of the courts, because by its plain 
language, Congress has already struck a balance favoring environmental review prior to 
construction of the homeport. Congress provided only one method to achieve its purpose. 
Thus, the district court lacked equitable discretion to deny the injunction." [d. at 934. 
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NDAA, unlike the CWA as interpreted in Romero-Barcelo, limited 
the courts' equitable discretion. 215 The court of appeals reversed the 
district court and permanently enjoined further work on the proj-
ect. 216 
Finally, in Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel,217 a California district 
court temporarily enjoined the Forest Service from harvesting 
burned timber adjacent to a designated wild and scenic river in 
violation of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA).218 To determine 
the underlying substantive policy of the Act, the court compared the 
language, history, and structure of the WSRA with the ESA, as 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in TV A, and with ANILCA, as 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Amoco. 219 If these elements of 
the WSRA were similar to those of the ESA, then Congress had 
eliminated the court's equitable discretion and an injunction must 
issue. 22o Conversely, if these elements were similar to those of AN-
215 [d. at 934. The district court followed this precedent in another Homeport project case, 
Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Wash. 1988). In that case, the district 
court granted a permanent injunction against the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy, 
stopping the Homeport project until permit requirements under NEPA, the CWA, and the 
NDAA were met. [d. at 911-14. Looking to these statutes, the district court found congres-
sional intent to prohibit national defense expenditures if environmental permit requirements 
were not met prior to the initiation of construction. [d. at 912, 914. Explaining that courts 
must first look to the statutes to see if Congress had restricted equitable discretion, the 
district court examined the CWA and found a violation of its substantive policies. [d. at 948-
49. The project undoubtedly would cause the irreparable environmental injury foreseen and 
prohibited by Congress. [d. at 949. The court distinguished Romero-Barcelo, noting that in 
Romero-Barcelo no pollution had occurred from the Navy's discharges of munitions into the 
water. [d. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15 (1982». Whereas in 
Hall, "[aJ failure to enjoin the Navy's disposal [of dredged material] would subject the Nation's 
waters to a real and present danger of pollution. This aspect distinguishes the instant situation 
from Romero-Barcelo." [d. at 949. Although national security was a consideration, the court 
found that the delay would not cause harm to the nation's defense capabilities and therefore 
would not outweigh the "significant risk of major irreparable environmental impact" if the 
permits were neglected. [d. at 949. 
216 Navy, 841 F.2d at 937. The court of appeals dissolved its injunction when the state 
Shorelines Hearings Board deadlocked, thereby upholding the Everett permit. 850 F.2d at 
600-01. 
217 701 F. Supp. 1473 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 
218 [d. at 1475-76; see Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1988). 
219 Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. at 1478-79. The court cited Amoco and Romero-Barcelo for the 
proposition that a court sitting in equity is not obligated to grant injunctions mechanically for 
violations of the law. [d. at 1477; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 
U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). The court 
further explained that the Ninth Circuit had rejected any presumption of irreparable injury 
from violations of NEPA and the CWA. Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. at 1477; see Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. at 320; Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988); Save 
the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 1988); supra notes 130--31, 204-08 
and accompanying text. 
220 Tyrrel, 701 F. Supp. at 1478. 
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ILCA, then Congress had not foreclosed equitable discretion, and 
the court must balance the harms before deciding upon an injunc-
tion. 221 
The district court found the WSRA to be most similar to ANILCA 
in that, though Congress already had weighed the conflicting inter-
ests, the statute still allowed agencies flexibility in enforcing the 
Act. 222 Therefore, courts were allowed similar flexibility in deter-
mining whether an action violated the substantive values of the 
Act. 223 Though the Act did not require an automatic presumption of 
irreparable injury, the statute and its objectives would guide the 
court in balancing the equities. 224 The district court balanced the 
relative harms and found environmental injury to be of sufficient 
likelihood to allow a preliminary injunction to issue. 225 
In summary, whether the federal courts are interpreting NEP A 
or other, non-NEPA statutes, the lower courts have taken disparate 
stands on the applicability of equitable discretion to injunctive relief. 
The balance of harms, and the character of these harms-whether 
probable or merely likely-is at the center of this controversy. The 
next section will explore the conflicting interpretations of what is 
meant by the balance of harms and equitable discretion. 
III. EQUITABLE DISCRETION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND 
THE BALANCE OF HARMS 
A. Contradictory Applications of Equitable Discretion in the 
Lower Federal Courts 
1. Equitable Discretion and NEPA 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A) establishes pro-
cedural requirements for government agencies to follow when proj-
221 Id. at 1478-79. 
222 Id. at 1478. The National Park Service's recommendations to Congress, and the desig-
nation of the river as wild and scenic, 
Id. 
suggest that all the balancing between conflicting interests occurred prior to the 
instant litigation and that in effect Congress ordered preservation of the area .... 
Nonetheless . . . the fact that the WSRA directs that the executive engage in a 
relatively flexible review process militates against a similar analytical process being 
prohibited to the court. 
223 Id. "Such a statutory scheme does not require a necessary and inescapable inference 
that Congress intended to remove this court's equitable discretion." Id. at 1478-79 (citing 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987». 
224 Id. at 1479. 
225 See id. at 1490-92. 
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ects are being considered. 226 A violation of NEPA will not in itself 
harm the environment, though harm may result if its procedures are 
not followed and avoidable injuries to the environment are not dis-
covered. In fact, after an agency prepares an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), that agency may follow a plan that it knows to be 
harmful to the environment. The EIS requirement is meant merely 
to insure that an agency is informed fully about the environmental 
impact of its decisions. 
Legal challenges brought under NEPA usually aver that an agency 
has gathered insufficient information or has neglected one or more 
significant procedures. If the reasoning of Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcel0227 and Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
Alaska228 is followed, however, an injunction will issue only if irre-
parable harm is proven. Consequently, because NEPA indirectly 
affects the environment, no injunction might ever issue for a viola-
tion of NEPA if the Romero-Barcelo and Amoco reasoning were 
used. Therefore, the lower courts have been careful to distinguish 
their reasoning from the reasoning in Romero-Barcelo and Amoco 
when confronted with violations of NEP A. Because of this careful 
distinguishment, the decisions in the lower courts have been less 
than consistent. 
At one extreme, the courts of the First Circuit take notice of 
potential harms to the environment when deciding challenges to the 
NEP A process. 229 Actual harm to the environment need not be 
shown. The courts of the First Circuit recognize that bureaucratic 
commitment to existing project plans eventually may cause real 
environmental harm. While NEPA does not prohibit environmental 
harm directly, the statute is meant to guard against harm from 
uninformed decision-making. In essence, the creation of a proper 
EIS is analogous to the substantive procedural checks expressly 
provided for in ANILCA and other statutes. 230 
At the other extreme, the courts of the Second and Seventh 
Circuits require a showing of actual environmental harm resultant 
226 Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412,426 (7th Cir. 1984) ("NEPA itself is procedural"); 
see NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982); see also, e.g., Environmental Effects in the United States 
of Department of Defense Actions, 32 C.F.R. §§ 214.1-214.6 (1989); Environmental Protection 
Agency Purpose and Functions, 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1989). 
227 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
228 480 U. S. 531 (1987). 
229 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1989); Massachusetts v .. Watt, 
716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983). 
220 See Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 503. 
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from a flawed EIS.231 Mere bureaucratic commitment and the con-
sequent potential harm to the environment are not enough. For 
example, dredge wastes dumped at underwater disposal sites have 
to pose an actual harm to coastal waters.232 A violation of the pro-
cedures of NEP A, coupled with mere potential harm, is not enough 
injury to sustain injunctive relief. 
In between lie the courts of the Ninth Circuit, which require 
convincing proof of potential harm. 233 While the courts of the Ninth 
Circuit recognize the inherent dangers of bureaucratic commitment, 
they require a showing that potential harm likely will result. A 
showing of actual harm is not required. Likewise a showing that a 
harm potentially could occur is insufficient. The potential harm must 
be likely to occur. 
Unfortunately, the approach of the courts in the Ninth Circuit is 
information-dependent. The courts must consider any and all factors 
involved with a project, in essence compiling their own quasi-EIS.234 
The quasi-EIS is then compared to the allegedly flawed EIS and a 
decision is made based upon the likely potential harms unaddressed 
by the official EIS. An obvious problem, beyond the burden of having 
to gather information in an agency-like fashion, is the possibility that 
insufficient data will be presented to a court. If insufficient data are 
presented, then a court may decide that, for example, no harm will 
come from the clear cutting of undergrowth in a sequoia forest. 235 
Later, more thorough presentations may change a court's decision, 
but by then the environmental injury likely will have occurred. 236 
Equitable discretion is of little use when environmental harm 
likely will occur whether an injunction is issued or not. In Morgan 
v. Walter,237 for example, the court found that environmental harm 
likely would occur if a project went forward under a flawed EIS.238 
The court noted, however, that the project might go forward anyway 
on private land with consequential harm to the environment. 239 When 
231 See Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1143 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Huntington v. 
Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). 
232 See Huntington, 884 F.2d at 654. 
233 See Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service (USFS), 843 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1988); Morgan 
v. Walter, 728 F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (D. Idaho 1989); People ex rel Van de Kamp v. Marsh, 687 
F. Supp. 495, 501 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
234 See, e.g., Van de Kamp, 687 F. Supp. at 499-50l. 
235 See USFS, 843 F.2d at 1195. 
236 See id. 
237 728 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Idaho 1989). 
238 [d. at 1494. 
239 [d. 
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faced with this Hobson's choice, the court retreated to the sanctuary 
of the law and enjoined those harms that it could reach. 240 Equitable 
discretion, the creation of a quasi-EIS, and the evaluation of bu-
reaucratic commitment were of little use in balancing and preventing 
the likely harms to the environment to be encountered as a conse-
quence of either decision. 
The lower federal courts also are in conflict as to the use of 
equitable discretion, as defined in Romero-Barcelo and Amoco, to 
determine whether there exists bureaucratic commitment to a proj-
ect as planned or, if this commitment clearly exists, whether it would 
harm the NEPA decision-making process. 241 For example, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit looked to the actual harms that 
would occur if current studies on the health effects of low-level 
electromagnetic radiation were not incorporated into an EIS for the 
Navy's project ELF.242 In addition to finding the studies ambiguous 
and unpersuasive, the court of appeals weighed the possibility of 
bureaucratic commitment against the Navy's previously thorough 
Environmental Impact Statements. 243 The court of appeals found 
that the Navy usually took all current information into considera-
tion. 244 If new, pertinent information became available, the Navy 
would take that information into account when proceeding with the 
project. 
In other words, the organization responsible for an EIS for a 
project might not, in a court's view, be committed irrevocably to 
aspects of that project. Again, equitable discretion allows a court to 
determine not only the actual or probable harms to be encountered 
as the project progresses, but an organization's commitment to going 
forward with the project despite these harms. 245 If an organization 
seemed committed to going forward regardless of the harms, then a 
court might be more inclined to issue an injunction. But if an orga-
nization seemed flexible and accommodating, then a court might be 
disinclined to issue an injunction and more inclined to rely upon the 
reasonableness of the decision-makers. 
These contradictory positions of the lower courts come as a direct 
result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Romero-Barcelo and 
240 See id. 
241 Compare Sierra Club v. Hennessy, 695 F.2d 643, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1982) with Massachu-
setts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir. 1983). 
242 Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 422--24 (7th Cir. 1984). 
243 [d. 
244 [d. 
245 See Hennessy, 695 F.2d at 647-48; Wisconsin, 745 F.2d at 422--24. 
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Amoco. The requirement of actual, irreparable harm before an in-
junction can issue is counter to the intent of Congress in enacting 
NEP A. 246 Further, the Court itself has found that harm to the en-
vironment is often irreparable and should be given the consideration 
necessary to guard it sufficiently. Procedural diligence, and the price 
to be paid for the violation of required procedures, should become 
the prime concern of both the agencies and the courts.247 Otherwise, 
merely procedural statutes such as NEPA become futile exercises 
in bureaucracy. Meanwhile the environment, whether harmed in 
direct violation of a substantive statute or indirectly through viola-
tion of NEPA, will suffer. 248 
2. Equitable Discretion and Non-NEPA Statutes in the Lower 
Federal Courts 
The lower federal courts have rejected attempts to use equitable 
discretion to defeat the enforcement of non-NEPA statutes. 249 For 
example, in New York v. Gorsuch250 the administrator of the EPA 
unsuccessfully appealed to the district court's equitable discretion, 
arguing that special considerations should block the enforcement of 
CAA statutory time limits under which the EPA operated. In United 
States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel COrp.,251 the court of appeals, 
unlike the trial court, was unpersuaded that the unfortunate circum-
stances of the steel industry could be considered and that the bur-
dens of meeting CAA standards could be eliminated by judicial fiat. 
Likewise, the trial court in American Hawaii Cruises v. Skinner252 
was unimpressed by appeals to its equitable discretion and enforced 
its interpretation of the Jones Act. Finally, in United States v. 
246 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497,499 (lst Cir. 1989). 
247 E.g., id. at 500 ("[TJhe district court should take account of the potentially irreparable 
nature of this decisionmaking risk to the environment. And other courts seem to agree."). 
248 E.g., id. "[TJhe harm at stake is the harm to the environment, but the harm consists of 
the added risk to the environment that takes place when the governmental decisionmakers 
make up their minds without having before them an analysis ... of the likely effects of their 
decision upon the environment." [d. (emphasis in original)). 
249 While not an environmental case, Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 
754 F.2d 404 (lst Cir. 1985), is interesting in its use of equitable discretion to extend the 
enforcement of statutory requirements. The court found that the antitrust statute did not 
limit equitable discretion. Therefore, the court concluded that private parties could state a 
claim for divestiture as part of injunctive relief. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying 
text. 
250 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
251 818 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1987). 
252 713 F. Supp. 452 (D.D.C. 1989), dismissed, 893 F.2d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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Vineland Chemical Co., 253 the court acknowledged an astute attempt 
by the defendant to defeat enforcement of the RCRA using the 
Romero-Barcelo precedent. 
All of these cases had a common thread of argument: inequitable 
results if statutory law were enforced. 254 Fortunately, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. City and County of San Francisc0255 set 
a precedent preventing the use of equitable considerations to defeat 
statutory requirements. There, the city argued that enforcement of 
the statute had lapsed for twenty-five years; if enforcement were to 
commence after so long a time, circumstances unfair to the city would 
result. The Supreme Court, however, decided that the intent of 
Congress-as manifest by the language of the statute and. by the 
legislative history-was clear. The law, once interpreted by the 
courts to prohibit the conduct in question, must be enforced regard-
less of the equitable considerations. 
But because precedent is limited, the lower federal courts have a 
difficult time applying equitable discretion to statutes uninterpreted 
by the Supreme Court. Usually, a method of analogy is applied: if 
the statute is similar to the Clean Water Act (CW A) as interpreted 
253 692 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1988). 
254 On rare occasion courts will allow prohibited activities to continue. See Plater, Statutory 
Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 524, 536, 560-62 (1982) (discussing 
Hecht). For example, in Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council (ONRC) v. Marsh, the 
court allowed construction of a dam to continue even though the project was found to be in 
violation of NEPA. 677 F. Supp. 1072, 1075, 1078 (D. Or. 1987). This construction was allowed 
to continue to a level that the court found would ensure the safety of lives and property 
downstream. Id. Once this level was reached, however, the court required construction to be 
stopped. Id. 
Similarly, in American Motorcyclist Ass'n (AMA) v. Watt, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit allowed a desert conservation plan to be implemented despite substantial vio-
lations of the law under which the plan was developed. AMA, 714 F.2d 962, 964-65, 967 (9th 
Cir. 1983). The court, however, went on to distinguish these violations in a manner similar to 
that in Romero-Barcelo and in Amoco, finding the plan to be in compliance with the spirit of 
the law. See id. at 966. Congress's intent was to protect the desert in question, and the plan, 
though flawed, would do just that. See id. at 966-67. 
Finally, the courts are reluctant to order the impossible or the needlessly destructive. See, 
e.g., United States V. Niagara Falls, 706 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). In shaping 
relief for CWA permit violations, the Niagara Falls trial court considered capacities at which 
the sewage facilities could operate safely. Id. The court acknowledged the futility of ordering 
the city to process sewage at capacities sure to damage the treatment facilities. I d.; see supra 
note 109. 
When fashioning relief, however, courts must be careful not to allow the shape of the relief 
to overshadow the law, as was the case in Romero-Barcelo. There, the Supreme Court allowed 
the "relief"-no injunction because a permit was being pursued-to run directly counter to 
the requirements of the CWA. See Weinberger V. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982); 
supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
255 310 U. S. 16, 31 (1940). 
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in Romero-Barcelo, or ANILCA as interpreted in Amoco, then eq-
uitable discretion is allowed. A balance of harms must then take 
place. If, however, the statute is similar to the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) as interpreted in TVA v. Hill,256 then no equitable dis-
cretion is allowed. No balance of harms may take place. 
The courts of the Ninth Circuit, particularly, have incorporated 
this method of analogy, with varying results. In Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Hodel,257 the court compared the FCLAA to the ESA and 
the CWA, looking at the intent of Congress as defined by the sta-
tutory requirements. The court found the FCLAA most like the 
CWA, relying upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Romero-
Barcelo: no harm would come to the substantive goals of the FCLAA 
if the coal leases in question were frozen instead of completely 
voided. By harm, the court meant the harm defined in Romero-
Barcelo: actual, irreparable harm to the moving party, not just 
potential or temporary harm. Using the standard of Romero-Bar-
celo, the court found within its discretion the power to limit the 
sanctions for the violation of the statute. 
Conversely, in Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy,258 the 
court of appeals compared a provision of the NDAA-its language, 
history, and structure-to the ESA and found that Congress had 
limited equitable discretion. The court found it significant that the 
only method to enforce the Act was via injunctive relief. This single 
method of enforcement required the court to enjoin further work on 
the project, regardless of the type of work or the probability that 
the necessary permits would be issued. 259 Contrary to Romero-Bar-
celo, no actual harm was necessary beyond the mere violation of 
statutory requirements. 
Finally, in Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel,260 this method of analogy 
apparently became precedent for the courts of the Ninth Circuit. 
When faced with a statute that the Supreme Court has not inter-
preted in terms of equitable discretion, such as the WSRA, a court 
must compare that statute to the ESA and ANILCA. Consequently, 
in the Ninth Circuit, before any balancing of the equities can take 
place, a federal court must look to the statute and determine whether 
256 437 u.s. 153 (1978). 
257 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988). 
258 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.), modified, 850 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1988). 
259 Cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (the Court refused to allow 
injunction, based upon probability that permit would be issued coupled with lack of actual 
environmental harm and national security value of project). 
260 701 F. Supp. 1473, 1478 (E.D. Cal. 1988). 
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Congress has limited equitable discretion. This determination, how-
ever, encompasses both the unique circumstances of the case and 
the legislative and textual considerations of the statute. The courts 
will consider not only whether the statute is structured similarly to 
the ESA or ANILCA, but also whether Congress intended the 
statute to apply to the situation in dispute. 261 The harms to the 
parties are persuasive factors in deciding whether the statute should 
apply.262 Consequently, however, once the determination is made as 
to the limits upon equitable discretion, not much else remains to be 
balanced. Equitable discretion has, in effect, been subsumed by 
statutory interpretation. 
In summary, the courts of the Ninth Circuit have come almost full 
circle in their reasoning. The courts of that circuit now balance the 
probable harms in light of the statute at issue. Violation of the 
statute, in most cases, gives sufficient weight to the probable harms, 
and injunctive relief usually follows. This consideration of statutory 
requirements is similar to that used by the courts of the First Circuit 
when considering NEPA injunctions, as in Massachusetts v. Watt,263 
where probable harms, as defined by the statute, were enough to 
tip the balance in favor of injunctive relief. Similar reasoning should 
be adopted by the other circuits. 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Is Unclear Because the Court Has 
Obfuscated a Process That Is Essentially One of Statutory 
Interpretation 
Given any case in which continued violations of statute are at 
issue, the Supreme Court has a choice of precedent. If the Court 
decides that Congress has limited equitable discretion, then the 
Court would add to its TVA V. Hill264 line of precedents and would 
find an injunction appropriate. If the Court decides, however, that 
Congress has not limited equitable discretion, then the Court would 
add to its Weinberger v. Romero-Barcel0265 line of precedents and 
likely would find an injunction inappropriate. 266 
261 See, e.g., id. at 1478 (court compared assured destruction of snail darter habitat with 
contested allegations of harm to the river area). 
262 See, e.g., id. at 1478-79 (irreparable nature of environmental harm makes presumption 
of harm for violation of statute unnecessary). 
263 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
264 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
265 456 U. S. 305 (1982). 
266 The Court usually finds that equitable discretion has not been limited and then disallows 
an injunction to stop statutory violations. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
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In deciding which precedent to follow, the Court would look to the 
statute itself, as well as to the legislative history and the circum-
stances of the case. When Congress's mandate is clear, as in TVA 
when the Court found a strict prohibition against harming an endan-
gered species,267 then no equitable discretion would be available. No 
harms could be balanced. But when Congress's mandate does not 
clearly encompass the circumstances of the case, as in Romero-
Barcelo when the Court found no strict prohibition against dumping 
munitions into coastal waters as long as those waters were not 
harmed,268 then equitable discretion would be available. The Court 
then could balance the harms and make a decision as to the necessity 
of an injunction. 
The statutory language necessary to limit a court's equitable dis-
cretion is unclear.269 The method that the Supreme Court has applied 
to interpret congressional intent is inconsistent from case to case. 
In TV A, the Court identified language from the legislative histories 
that indicated the paramount importance of preserving endangered 
species. 270 Equitable arguments to the contrary were insufficient to 
overcome this clear mandate from Congress. 271 The Court refused 
to weigh the necessity of the project against the unknown potential 
value of an endangered species, and instead reserved this balance of 
policy priorities for the legislature. 272 
Conversely, in Romero-Barcelo the Court ignored clear statutory 
language limiting the discharge of munitions into coastal waters. 273 
Instead, the Court looked to the intent of Congress in enacting the 
statute-clean water-and relied upon the determination by the trial 
court that the bombing was not a harm to water quality.274 Because 
Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987); Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. The Court has yet 
simultaneously to find unlimited equitable discretion and to allow an injunction to issue. In 
other words, "equitable discretion" is a signal from the Court that it will not issue an injunction, 
even though the harms are supposedly balanced. 
267 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 184-86; supra notes 33--36 and accompanying text. 
268 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314-15; supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
269 The courts are subordinate to legislative mandate except when exercising the rights of 
judicial review. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 
281, 283 (1989). An analysis of legislative supremacy is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
270 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 177-87. 
271 See id. at 193-94; supra note 35 and accompanying text. The government would lose 
millions if the project were abandoned. TVA, 437 U. S. at 172. Also, Congress had been made 
aware of the controversy and yet continued to vote funds for the project. Id. at 189. 
272 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 194. 
27:1 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1982); supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
274 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314-15; supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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Congress meant to prohibit the discharge of munitions only if water 
quality were being harmed, the Court could determine that equitable 
discretion had not been limited. Finally, because equitable discretion 
had not been limited, equitable considerations such as national se-
curity could be weighed and, indeed, were found to outweigh bald 
statutory prohibitions. 
The Court attempted to distinguish the outcome in Romero-Bar-
celo from the outcome in TVA. 275 In TV A, the extinction of a species 
was at stake. If the Court did not follow the prohibitions of Congress, 
then a potentially valuable life form would be lost forever. In Rom-
ero-Barcelo, however, not only were the stakes not as great-the 
level of water quality in the waters off a bombing range-but the 
possible harm was reparable. If, however, the courts always have 
retained the power to fashion injunctive relief, as the Court reasoned 
in Romero-Barcelo,276 then the Court in TV A should have been able 
to shape an injunction to accommodate all parties. The Court could 
have issued an order prohibiting the impoundment of water until the 
endangered species had been relocated successfully, or the Court 
could have required that genetic samplings of the endangered species 
be taken and stored. 277 The specific shape of the remedy would have 
been unimportant, though, as long as the intent of Congress-the 
preservation of an endangered species-were accomplished. 
The intent of Congress, however, might not be defined so easily. 
In Griffin,278 the Court found clear statutory language: if a seaman's 
pay were retained illegally, then each and every day of retainment 
had to be counted toward compensation. 279 Further, the Court found 
that Congress's intent in enacting the statute was in part punitive. 280 
Therefore, an award of $302,790.40 for the wrongful withholding of 
275 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314. 
276 See id. at 312-13. 
277 The price control statute in Hecht, which allowed the courts to issue an "injunction ... 
or other order," could be seen as a codification of the courts' ability to shape remedial relief. 
See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 322, 326-27 (1944); supra notes 61-62 and accom-
panying text. If, however, the courts traditionally have had the ability to shape relief regard-
less of statutory mandate, then this phrase in the statute is superfluous. Congress likely 
recognized the heavy burdens upon regulated businesses in its requirement that an injunction 
"shall" issue upon the determination of violations. See id. Knowing that the courts would be 
bound by such a strict statutory requirement, Congress no doubt expressly allowed the courts 
to have discretion in shaping remedial relief under the statute by including the phrase "or 
other order" in the provisions. See id. 
278 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
279 See id. at 570. 
280 I d. at 572. 
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$412.50 was well within the intent of Congress, even though the 
award was nearly 734 times the amount withheld. 
The district court and the court of appeals, however, had held an 
award of $6881.60 to be sufficiently punitive and within the intent 
of Congress. 281 Further, in dissent, Justice Stevens found room for 
the lower courts' determinations in his interpretation of the phrase 
"[wages withheld] without sufficient cause."282 Justice Stevens rea-
soned that, once a seaman became gainfully reemployed, there arose 
sufficient cause to withhold wages and the counting of days would 
stop.283 Therefore, while the intent of Congress was clearly punitive, 
the extent of the punishment was a matter of interpretation. 
Even with the text of the statute and the full legislative history 
as a guide, the decision of the Supreme Court in any single case 
cannot be predicted. Congress has available no magic words to limit 
the courts' equitable discretion. Even if Congress states explicitly 
in a statute that certain conduct is prohibited or required, such as 
the discharge of munitions into coastal waters, the courts neverthe-
less can exercise their equitable discretion-their interpretation of 
the intent of Congress-and allow the conduct to continue or lapse. 
Conversely, if the courts decide to hew close to the textual line, 
disregarding the equitable circumstances of a case, as in Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., then absurd consequences may result. 
There are few Supreme Court precedents as to the limits of eq-
uitable discretion. Because of this paucity of precedent, the lower 
courts have developed contradictory methods for applying equitable 
discretion. Further, because these methods are contradictory, the 
decisions issued by courts applying these methods are likewise con-
tradictory: cases with similar facts may be decided differently from 
circuit to circuit. 
To alleviate these problems, the Supreme Court should acknowl-
edge that statutory interpretation lies at the heart of equitable 
discretion. While the Court couches its reasoning in terms of equity 
and the fashioning of remedial relief, in reality the Court merely is 
interpreting statute. 284 The Court has asserted that it may utilize 
281 See id. at 568. 
282 See id. at 583-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
283 See id. at 580, 583 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
284 Cf. Plater, supra note 254, at 527-28 (once a statute is interpreted to prohibit an act, 
courts cannot apply equitable discretion to allow act to continue; such discretion would be 
judicial amendment of the statute); Comment, Preliminary Injunctions as Relief for Sub-
stantial Procedural Violations of Environmental Statutes: Amoco Production Co. v. Village 
of Gambell, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 105, 106 (1987) (interpretation of Congress's intent and nature 
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discretion and allow violations of statute to continue. But the Court 
is not exercising this discretion. Instead, the Court is placing dis-
puted conduct outside the statute; the Court is interpreting the 
statute so that disputed conduct is not a violation. 285 
In Romero-Barcelo, the Court interpreted the CWA and found 
that Congress had not intended to prohibit flatly the discharge of 
pollutants without a permit.286 Specifically, the Court found that 
Congress had not intended to prohibit the Navy from inadvertently 
dumping munitions during the course of target practice. While the 
discharge of munitions into coastal waters without a permit was 
prima facie illegal, the dumping of munitions by the Navy did not 
quite fit within the intent of this prohibition. 287 The Romero-Barcelo 
Court effectively interpreted the CWA to exclude the Navy's target 
practice from its provisions. 
Similarly, in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
Alaska,288 the Court found the Secretary of the Interior's actions to 
be within the spirit of those required by ANILCA, though not within 
the actual procedures of ANILCA.289 Because the Secretary had 
complied with the intent of the statute, no substantive violation of 
ANILCA had occurred. Equitable discretion, and an injunction re-
quiring the Secretary to corp.ply with the procedures, would be 
unnecessary. 
Finally, though TV A was to the contrary, the Court could have 
used reasoning similar to that of Romero-Barcelo and Amoco to allow 
the dam to be completed. While the text of the ESA flatly prohibited 
the destruction of an endangered species' habitat, the statute could 
have been interpreted to allow for the completion of the project. By 
following Justice Powell's arguments in dissent, the Court could have 
found that Congress had not intended the ESA to apply retroactively 
of harm to be remedied or prevented by statute determines restrictions on courts' equitable 
discretion). 
285 See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987); Weinberger 
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15 (1982); cf. supra note 266. 
286 See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314-15. 
287 The Court indicated that, if a permit were not being pursued, then the equities would 
have to be rebalanced. Id. at 315 n.9. The Court, however, did not say what would be the 
likely result of this rebalancing. The Court went on to note that the Navy's pursuit of a permit 
was being blocked by further litigation. Id. Because it could know neither the length of this 
litigation nor the outcome, the Court in effect was giving the Navy permission to continue 
the munitions discharges indefinitely. This permission belies the Court's assertion that it 
merely was shaping a temporary remedy and reinforces the argument that the Court inter-
preted the CWA not to include the munition discharges. 
288 480 U.S. 531 (1987). 
289 I d. at 544. 
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to projects already begun.29o Similarly, the Court could have found 
that Congress had not intended the ESA to apply to species listed 
as endangered after a project had already begun. Lastly, the Court 
could have found that Congress had modified the ESA by appropri-
ating funds for the project while aware of the possible extermination 
of a species by the proj ect. 291 
In each instance, the Court would have been using what it would 
term equitable discretion, that is the power to withhold an injunction 
when Congress's intent is unclear. The statute would have been 
interpreted to exclude the particular circumstances of the project 
and, because there then would have been no violation of statute, an 
injunction would have been unnecessary. The project could go for-
ward and the law would be intact. 
The Supreme Court should acknowledge equitable discretion to 
be nothing more than a process of statutory interpretation. The law, 
then, would be more predictable. Lower court decisions would be 
less contradictory, and the task of making a decision in any single 
case would be simpler. The courts, via statutory interpretation, 
would decide if Congress meant to prohibit the conduct in question. 
If Congress did not prohibit the action, then no injunction would 
issue. If, however, Congress meant to prohibit the conduct in ques-
tion, then an injunction would be required. 
Harm to one party or the other is almost inevitable when statutory 
law is enforced. The courts, however, must place these harms within 
the context of the statute. These harms then become an element of 
statutory interpretation, whereas under the process of equitable 
discretion these harms are balanced in a vacuum beyond the limits 
of statute. While absurd results are possible when statutes are in-
terpreted closely, the potential for harm from equitable discretion is 
greater. 
One potential harm, especially acute in the context of preliminary 
injunctions, would be decisions made by the courts based upon in-
sufficient information. For example, the harms to the reproductive 
cycle of giant sequoias from the clear cutting of undergrowth might 
not be fully represented to a court. The court would then balance 
the harms on an insufficient record and likely disallow an injunction. 
The harm prohibited by Congress-avoidable damage to the envi-
ronment-would then occur.292 Conversely, if a court examined the 
290 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,201-02,205-06,210 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
291 Cf. id. at 189-93. 
292 See Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190, 1194-96 (9th Cir. 1988) 
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possible harms in light of the statute, an injunction would likely 
issue. 
Statutory interpretation is the province of the courts. 293 Equitable 
discretion cuts too close to legislative prerogative. Elected officials 
have the responsibility to choose socially significant policies: to weigh 
the value of a water project against the value of an endangered 
species, or the value of clean water against national security, or the 
value of oil exploration against aboriginal subsistence. The courts 
are not equipped to decide these social issues, and the practical 
impact of the Supreme Court's attempts to balance the equities is 
that of prolonged litigation. 294 Conversely, when the Court interprets 
the law and does not balance the equities, litigation usually ends and 
the legislature, if necessary, makes adjustments to the law. 295 
When Congress enacts a statute that includes procedures or re-
quirements, Congress is doing more than evincing its intent. Sta-
(harms from clear cutting in sequoia groves not apparent until damage done); supra notes 
136-40, 237 and accompanying text. 
293 See TVA, 437 U.S. at 194-95; United States v. 9/1kg Containers, 854 F.2d 173,179 (7th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1118 (1989) ("Judges' role is to decipher and enforce the 
existing scheme, whatever they think of its wisdom."). 
294 See, e.g., Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273,1275,1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (remand 
of case to district court for factfinding almost two years after Supreme Court decision in 
Amoco); United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832, 833--34 (1st Cir. 1983) (jurisdiction of 
subsequent suit over NPDES permit process decided a year and a half after Supreme Court 
decision in Romero-Barcelo). 
If the Court had found against the Navy in Romero-Barcelo, then the Navy would have 
had to obtain the permit as required by the government of Puerto Rico. If, however, the 
Navy could not comply with the permit process, then the Secretary of Defense could have 
applied to the President for an executive order exempting the target practice from the permit 
requirement. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1982). In other words, 
Congress had allowed the President the power to weigh national security interests against 
the desirability of clean water. 
If the Court had found against the Secretary of the Interior in Amoco, the oil exploration 
would have been postponed while the Secretary held hearings and made inquiries into the 
impact of the exploration on subsistence uses. Once this inquiry was complete, however, the 
native Alaskans likely would not have had any need for litigation-their subsistence concerns 
would have been heard, considered, and met if the procedures of ANILCA were followed. 
Further, even if the Alaskans wished to litigate, their recourse to the courts would have been 
limited by the Secretary's adherence to procedure. 
295 No further litigation followed the decision in TVA. Congress, however, amended the 
ESA, creating a committee to study the problem and to issue an ESA exemption to the 
project, if warranted. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1988). After a period of inquiry the committee 
unanimously decided not to grant an exception. Farber, supra note 1, at 518 ("The dam, the 
committee believed, was a dubious venture from the beginning, quite aside from its effect on 
the snail darter."). Contrary to this decision, Congress voted to allow the project to continue. 
[d. Reports indicate, however, that the snail darter survived the flood and is doing fine. See 
More Darters, 16 NAT. J. 1456 (1984). 
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tutory procedures are the steps to be taken, the hash marks of 
progress toward compliance with the intent of the law. If the courts 
are allowed to use their equitable discretion to enforce the perceived 
intent of Congress, divorced from the enacted requirements of Con-
gress, then all the minutiae and nuances of legislation will be com-
promised. The courts might then become not enforcers and inter-
preters of the law, as is their true role in government, but legislators 
furthering their sense of judicial self. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has taken contradictory positions on whether 
equitable discretion may be used to permit violations of statutes to 
continue. In one line of cases, the Court decided that Congress had 
limited equitable discretion via statute. In another line of cases, the 
Court decided that Congress had not limited equitable discretion. 
N either line of cases identified the exact statutory language neces-
sary to limit equitable discretion, and neither line of cases made 
clear under what circumstances the courts could employ equitable 
discretion. 
Consequently, the lower courts have taken contradictory positions 
on whether certain statutes limit equitable discretion or not, and 
under what circumstances equitable discretion mayor may not be 
employed. This contradiction is especially apparent in cases arising 
under the National Environmental Policy Act: the courts of the First 
Circuit will issue injunctions based upon harm likely to result from 
bureaucratic inertia, whereas the courts of the Ninth Circuit will 
only issue injunctions based upon the likelihood of physical harm to 
the environment. 
Because of these contradictions in lower court decisions, the Su-
preme Court should avoid the label "equitable discretion." Instead, 
the Court should acknowledge that the determination as to whether 
a statute has limited equitable discretion is, in reality, mere statu-
tory interpretation. The Court has stated that the courts have the 
power under equity to allow violations of statutes to continue. But 
this power may be limited by Congress via statute. Therefore, be-
cause there are no magic words that Congress may use to limit or 
allow equitable discretion, the statute must be interpreted as to 
whether or not discretion has been limited in light of the circum-
stances of each case. If the statute is interpreted to prohibit the 
actions in question, then an injunction must issue. If, however, the 
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statute is interpreted not to prohibit the actions in question, then 
no injunction would be available because there would be no violation 
of the law. 
The courts, therefore, do not have the power to allow violations 
of statutes to continue. Nevertheless, they do have the power to 
interpret statutes in light of the circumstances of each individual 
case. Factors such as the likelihood of harm to the parties, the 
likelihood of harm to third parties, the likelihood of harm to the 
public interest, and exigent or exculpatory situations may be consid-
ered by the courts during the interpretation of a statute. Foremost 
in the courts' reasoning should be whether a statute was meant to 
prohibit the conduct at issue, not whether a statute allows for the 
exercise of equitable power. Once this question is answered, there 
is no longer a need for equitable discretion. 
